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competition and may introduce new risks if not supported by effective governance (Vives,
                  2019). As a result, the stabilizing effect of digitalization depends on whether banks
                  maintain strong managerial discipline and cost control.
                        2.4. Hypotheses development
                        The preceding discussion suggests that bank stability is shaped by governance at
                  multiple levels, including ESG performance, institutional quality, and operational
                  efficiency. From stakeholder and legitimacy perspectives, ESG performance strengthens
                  governance structures, enhances transparency, and builds stakeholder trust. These
                  mechanisms support more prudent risk management and improve resilience.
                        H1: ESG performance has a positive effect on bank stability.
                        Institutional theory highlights the role of the regulatory environment in shaping
                  financial outcomes. Stronger institutional quality improves enforcement and reduces
                  governance distortions, thereby enhancing stability.
                        H2: Higher institutional quality (lower corruption) is associated with greater bank
                  stability.
                        Operational efficiency reflects managerial discipline and effective cost control.
                  Banks with higher inefficiency tend to exhibit weaker profitability and lower resilience to
                  shocks.
                        H3: Higher cost inefficiency is associated with lower bank stability.
                        3. Research methodology
                        3.1. Data
                        This study uses a panel dataset of 144 listed commercial banks across eight Asian
                  countries over the period 2021 to 2024, including Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the
                  Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The sample consists of 576 bank-year
                  observations and captures both cross-sectional and time variation in bank stability and
                  ESG performance.
                        Bank-level financial data and ESG scores are obtained from Bloomberg, while
                  macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth and inflation are collected from the World
                  Bank’s WDI. Institutional quality is measured using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
                  with the Rule of Law indicator from the Worldwide Governance Indicators used for
                  robustness. In both cases, higher values indicate better institutional quality.
                        Bank stability (LN1ZSCORE) is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the Z-
                  score, which reflects the distance to default based on profitability, capitalization, and
                  earnings volatility. This transformation helps reduce the influence of outliers and improve
                  distributional properties (Laeven and Levine, 2009). ESG performance is the main
                  explanatory variable, while corruption and other bank-level and macroeconomic factors
                  are included as controls.
                        To limit the impact of extreme values, EFFR and EA are winsorized at the 1st and
                  99th percentiles prior to estimation.
                        3.2. Methodology
                        To examine the relationship between ESG performance and bank stability, this
                  study estimates the following baseline model:
                        LN1ZSCOREit​ = β0 + β1​  ESGit​  + β2​  CORRUPTIONct ​  + β3LN_TAit ​  + β4EAit ​  +

                           β5EFFRit ​  + β6LSit ​  + β7GDPGct ​  + β8INFLATIONct​  + μi ​  + λt​ + εit​ .
                        where:
                          denotes banks and   denotes year
                        LN1ZSCOREit represents bank stability


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