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and research organizations jointly finance and govern partnerships in sectors such as
aviation and semiconductors. These models allow risk-sharing across many actors and
support the development of strategic technology value chains. At the same time, the
failure of the Galileo satellite PPP demonstrates that innovation partnerships can break
down when incentives and risk allocation are poorly structured.
South Korea has relied on state-led collaborative R&D programmes linking
universities, research institutes, and firms, often with mandatory co-investment by the
private sector. This has supported technology transfer to major domestic firms. Singapore,
by contrast, has focused on creating innovation hubs and co-funded ecosystems where
the government provides infrastructure and incentives while firms locate R&D facilities
and collaborate with public institutions.
Across these experiences, several common elements can be identified. Successful
innovation PPPs generally involve a catalytic role of the State, credible risk-sharing and
reward-sharing mechanisms, flexible legal arrangements, professional intermediary or
coordinating institutions, and a clear focus on strategic technology sectors. These
elements are highly relevant to Vietnam’s current situation.
4.3. Lessons and policy implications for Vietnam
The combined analysis of Vietnam’s current state and international experience
suggests several key implications.
First, Vietnam should move from legal recognition to practical piloting. Since the
legal framework has only recently been established, the immediate priority is to design
and implement carefully selected pilot projects in areas where PPP is most feasible, such
as digital infrastructure, smart city services, innovation centers, shared laboratories, AI
applications for public services, and selected strategic production initiatives.
Second, the State must play an active market-shaping role. International cases show
that innovation PPPs rarely emerge spontaneously. Public agencies must create
momentum through seed capital, procurement commitments, co-investment
mechanisms, or enabling infrastructure.
Third, risk-sharing must be credible in practice, not only in legal language. Public
agencies, scientists, and firms need confidence that participation in experimental or high-
risk innovation projects will not expose them to unreasonable sanctions if failure occurs
despite proper procedure.
Fourth, Vietnam needs stronger institutional flexibility and project governance.
High-tech PPPs differ fundamentally from infrastructure PPPs because outputs are often
intangible, timelines are uncertain, and technologies change rapidly. Contracting,
evaluation, and management mechanisms must therefore be more adaptive.
Fifth, the policy framework must protect intellectual property rights, benefit-sharing,
and commercialization incentives. Without clarity on ownership and returns, private firms
will remain cautious.
Finally, Vietnam should adapt international models selectively rather than copy
them mechanically. Given its current level of institutional maturity and resource capacity,
Vietnam is more likely to succeed first with smaller, application-oriented, and
governance-supported PPPs than with very large and technologically complex projects.
5. Policies and solutions to promote public-private partnerships in high-tech
innovation in Vietnam
Based on the theoretical discussion, current domestic conditions, and international
lessons, Vietnam needs a coherent set of policies and implementation mechanisms to

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